![]() ![]() The document comprises an introduction, four chapters and a final section with the conclusions and recommendations stemming from the study. This document has been prepared in compliance with Activity III.1.2 of the Work Programme of SELA for the year 2015, entitled “Analysis of the economic and financial relations between Latin America and the Caribbean and the BRICS countries”. Key words Mechanism – economic growth – development - projects However this interdependence which is considered as being a “win-win” relationship when critically examined is considered as not being equitable, with China obtaining huge business contracts and natural resources while Cameroon is rather getting assistance in terms of infrastructural stadia, government buildings and other projects that have a weak link to economic growth, made up of low quality materials, limited technological transfer and little opportunities for employment. This therefore raises the concern to know if the mechanism used by china to finance African development projects is appropriate for the growth and development of these African countries in general and Cameroon in particular? Equally questions what the underlying motive behind the Chinese financing of African development projects is? What are the Chinese institutions using these mechanisms to finance African development projects? We therefore used the cooperation theory and the interdependence theory to develop our work whereby Africa as a poor and underdeveloped actor is in search for financial resources and China as a relatively better off actor who is in need of raw materials and markets thus making them dependent on each other. ![]() However, China uses a very effective strategy whereby it provides financing in the form of a package consisting of funds for development, the relevant material and the labor force while concentrating on funding beautiful and concrete visible projects but which have a weak link to growth and development. On the other hand, the cooperation between Cameroon and China opened up several opportunities for growth backed up by concrete benefits to Cameroon. ![]() These commercial exchanges were relatively unfruitful to the growth and development of Cameroon till Cameroon decided to diversify its partners, China being the most prominent of them. The responsibility to ensure a positive outcome rests, however, on the African side as much as on China.Įven after its independence, the Republic of Cameroon still carried out commercial exchanges with its colonial masters and other occidental countries. ![]() Although there are some meaningful positive signs, many challenges persist, and as such the long-term developmental impact of this particular tool remains uncertain. The author argues that the impact has been mixed. The analysis focuses on whether this instrument is actually promoting African development or fuelling instead China’s economic growth at the expense of African economies. Embodying the principle of mutual benefit, China has consistently combined the extension of financial assistance for infrastructure construction in Africa with the expansion of Chinese business interests and the pursuit of resource security goals. This formula, offering generous loans for infrastructure in exchange for resource access, came into being largely as a default cooperation tool, inspired by China’s own domestic experience, its competitive advantages and Africa’s receptivity to this kind of barter deal. This paper discusses China’s use of infrastructure-for-resources loans in Africa as a winwin economic cooperation tool. At the same time, the project also poses challenges for China, especially in terms of promoting poverty alleviation without resorting to trickle-down assumptions about an infrastructure-focused approach to development. In addition to offering a concrete opportunity to legitimise China's multilateralism strategy – burnishing China's image as a responsible yet pro-reform global player – the bank project also allows China to influence international development norms. I argue that China's interests in backing the bank project are primarily political. What, then, motivates China's participation in the initiative, and what can it bring to the table? This article analyses China's interests in the BDB in the light of its past experiences with development, at home and abroad. From the perspective of the Chinese government, which already leads a vast and far-reaching cooperation programme, the bank will not represent a significant addition to its cooperation portfolio. In 2013 the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) grouping agreed to undertake what will, when implemented, become its most concrete project yet: the BRICS Development Bank (BDB). ![]()
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